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GOOD LAW FOR “BAD HOMBRES”
Matthew Neely*
ABSTRACT
This Article responds to President Trump’s proclamation that he may send,
with Mexico’s consent, the U.S. military into Mexico to fight drug cartels. It
particularly considers whether, during such an expedition, the U.S. military
would be constrained by the law of armed conflict, human rights law, or
neither. The Article concludes that the law of armed conflict would not apply
but human rights law would. In support of this conclusion, the Article
examines why the drug cartel violence in Mexico cannot legally be considered
an armed conflict. The Article then explains why human rights law, on the
other hand, would apply to any U.S. military action inside the territory of
Mexico. In doing so, the Article discusses the U.S. government’s historical
position that the United States has no extraterritorial human rights legal
obligations. This Article argues to the contrary—that the United States does
have extraterritorial human rights legal obligations within the specific scenario
of a U.S. military expedition into Mexico because of both treaty and customary
international law. This Article is important because it examines topical issues:
the Mexican drug war, the possible involvement of the U.S. military, and the
application of the law of war and human rights law to hybrid conflicts.

INTRODUCTION
The United States and Mexico share a border, are trading partners, and
have a mutual interest in each other’s stability.1 It is not surprising, then, that
the United States views the illicit Mexican drug trade, and its attendant
violence, as an increasingly cancerous threat to U.S. security.2 Since 2006, the
Mexican government has made defeating the drug cartels behind the illicit
trade a priority. Still, their progress has been slow and President Trump said he
*
Matthew Neely is an active duty United States Marine. The opinions expressed in this Article are
solely the opinion of the author and do not portray or presume to portray any opinions of either the U.S.
Department of Defense, U.S. Navy, or U.S. Marine Corps. I want to express my gratitude for my family’s
support. I love you guys.
1
JUNE BEITTEL, CONG. RES. SERV., R41576, MEXICO: ORGANIZED CRIME AND DRUG TRAFFICKING
ORGANIZATIONS, at 3 (2015).
2
See id.

NEELY_GALLEYPROOFS2

256

2/1/2018 3:27 PM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

might, with Mexico’s consent, deploy the U.S. military to help defeat these
“bad hombres.”3
As a candidate, President Trump criticized recent uses of the U.S. military
as having been too “politically correct.”4 President Trump further claimed the
targeting and killing of civilians is appropriate in some circumstances,5 but
later clarified “the U.S. is bound by laws and treaties and [he] will not order
our military or other officials to violate those laws . . . .”6 President Trump’s
rhetoric makes ascertaining what law applies to a potential U.S. military
engagement with Mexican drug cartels important for two reasons. First, the
United States is founded on democratic principles and a respect for the law,
and the United States’ failure to identify and follow applicable law would
undermine its own legitimacy.7 Second, the United States’ security and
prosperity hinges in part on a rules-based international order; therefore, the
United States should use its power to underwrite that international order rather
than erode its relevance.8
Concerns over jus ad bellum international legal issues are immediately
dispensed with because, under my proposed scenario, the U.S. military would
enter Mexico with Mexico’s consent.9 Jus ad bellum is the body of
international law that guides state behavior vis-à-vis the use of force.10 Jus ad
bellum protects the principle of state sovereignty.11 When one state consents to
another state’s use of force within its own territory, as is proposed in this
Article, the issues of sovereignty and jus ad bellum become moot.12 What

3
Anna Giaritelli, Trump: Mexican President “Very Willing” to Accept US Troops in Drug Cartel
Fight, WASH. EXAMINER (Feb. 5, 2017), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/trump-mexican-president-verywilling-to-accept-us-troops-in-drug-cartel-fight/article/2613982; Vivian Salama, Trump to Mexico: Take Care
of “Bad Hombres” or US Might, AP NEWS (Feb. 2, 2017), https://apnews.com/0b3f5db59b2e4aa78cdbbf
008f27fb49.
4
Tom LoBianco, Donald Trump on Terrorists: ‘Take Out Their Families’, CNN (Dec. 3, 2015),
http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/02/politics/donald-trump-terrorists-families/index.html.
5
Id.
6
Kristina Wong, Trump: “I Will Not Order a Military Officer to Disobey the Law”, THE HILL (Mar. 4,
2016), http://thehill.com/policy/defense/271823-trump-says-he-wont-order-military-to-violate-laws.
7
See Harold Koh, Why Do States Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2628 (1997).
8
See John B. Emerson, U.S. Ambassador to Germany, The Importance of a Rules-Based International
Order, 14th Berlin Security Conference: Euro-Atlantic Partnership; Firm Anchor in a Turbulent World (Nov.
17, 2015), available at https://de.usembassy.gov/the-importance-of-a-rules-based-international-order/.
9
Giaritelli, supra note 3.
10
LAURIE R. BLANK & GREGORY P. NOONE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT:
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES IN THE LAW OF WAR 15 (2013).
11
Id. at 16.
12
See id. at 17.
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remains is identifying the law that governs the military’s conduct once inside
Mexico.
Is it international humanitarian law (IHL) (i.e., jus in bello or law of armed
conflict)? If there is no armed conflict in Mexico, then IHL is not applicable.13
Is it international human rights law (IHRL)? The U.S. government holds the
position, as discussed infra, that it has no treaty-based IHRL obligations in
territories where it is not the controlling governmental authority. If neither IHL
nor IHRL applies, the military could be ordered to conduct operations in a
manner that is not too “politically correct” for President Trump.
This Article concludes that there is no armed conflict in Mexico, so IHL
would not apply, but that the U.S. military would be bound by IHRL while
conducting operations against Mexican drug cartels. To that end, Part I of this
Article provides background facts concerning the Mexican campaign against
drug cartels. Part II considers why the Mexican drug cartel violence is not an
armed conflict and why IHL is accordingly not applicable. Part III examines
why IHRL is applicable. Part IV discusses how U.S. domestic law requires the
President, and by extension the military, to follow IHRL. Part V offers
concluding analysis.
I.

BACKGROUND ON MEXICAN “DRUG WAR”

Part I(A) examines the drug cartel violence in Mexico. Part I(B) discusses
the organizational structures of the drug cartels.
A. Violence
In 2006, Mexican President Felipe Calderón “declared war on the [drug]
cartels.”14 President Calderón increased the number of Mexican soldiers tasked
with fighting the drug cartels from 20,000 to 50,000.15 The Mexican drug
cartels have violently resisted President Calderón’s crackdown. It is estimated
that the ensuing violence resulted in a minimum of 80,000 deaths between
2006 and 2015.16 The violence has spread, existing between cartels themselves

13

Id. at 83.
Ashley Fantz, The Mexico Drug War: Bodies for Billions, CNN (Jan. 20, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/
2012/01/15/world/mexico-drug-war-essay/index.html.
15
Christopher Woody, After a Decade Fighting the Cartels, Mexico May Be Looking for a Way to Get
Its Military Off the Front Line, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 13, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/mexicanmilitary-role-in-fighting-drug-war-and-cartels-2017-2.
16
BEITTEL, supra note 1, at 2.
14
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and between the government and the cartels.17 It is predominantly marked by
“shootouts” often involving the use of high caliber rifles and automatic
weapons, the use of grenades, and sporadic use of car bombs.18 It has also
included “coordinated attacks against the Mexican military” and, in one
notable instance, the “downing of a military helicopter.”19 The violence can be
gratuitous, as the drug cartels are known to dismember their murdered victims
and attach messages to them. For example, “criminal groups and their allies
deposited 14 headless bodies in front of the city hall” and “have left 18
dismembered bodies in vans near Lake Chapala, an area frequented by tourists
and U.S. retirees outside Guadalajara. They used a dump truck to unload 49
more corpses, missing not only heads but also feet and hands, outside
Monterrey, Mexico’s main industrial city.”20
In 2011, the Mexican political scientist Eduardo Guerrero-Gutiérrez
identified two types of drug cartel violence.21 The first is “drug-trafficking
violence,” and the second is “mafia ridden violence.”22 Drug-trafficking
violence intends “to maintain or gain control over drug-trafficking routes,
points of entry and exit, and distribution markets.”23 Mafia-ridden violence is
“kidnapping, extortion and executions” motivated by profit or to “keep or gain
control over a limited territory (a few blocks of a neighborhood) in which the
organization could run its illegal activities.”24
In December 2012, Enrique Peña Nieto assumed the Office of the President
of Mexico. Since then, the rate of drug cartel violence-related deaths has
slowly declined.25 The cartels have instead, “furthered their expansion into
other illegal activities, such as extortion, kidnapping, and oil theft, and the
organizations now pose a multi-faceted organized criminal challenge to

17
Mexico Travel Warning, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://travel.state.gov/content/passports/en/
alertswarnings/mexico-travel-warning.html/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2017).
18
Robert Beckhusen, The Tools of Mexico’s Drug Cartels, From Landmines to Monster Trucks, WIRED
(Nov. 30, 2012), https://www.wired.com/2012/11/cartel-weapons/; Mexico Drug War Fast Facts, CNN,
http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/02/world/americas/mexico-drug-war-fast-facts/index.html (last visited Nov. 13,
2017).
19
BEITTEL, supra note 1, at 27.
20
William Booth, Mexico’s Two Major Crime Cartels Now at War, WASH. POST (May 24, 2012),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/mexicos-two-major-crime-cartels-now-at-war/2012/05/24/gJQAUhKl
mU_story.html?utm_term=.c198112c0dea.
21
EDUARDO GUERRERO-GUTIÉRREZ, SECURITY, DRUGS, AND VIOLENCE IN MEXICO: A SURVEY (2011),
available at http://fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/93.securitydrugs.pdf.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
BEITTEL, supra note 1, at 1–2.
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governance in Mexico . . . .”26 This suggests that “mafia ridden violence” is on
the rise while “drug-trafficking violence” is on the decline. Indeed, the drug
cartels’ expansion into other illegal activities can be understood as an adaptive
means to achieve the cartels’ central aim: making money. Accordingly, “drug
cartels are similar to legitimate profit-making enterprises. They seek to fill
market demand or stimulate new demand for their products.”27
The use of the Mexican military to combat the drug cartels has not been
without criticism.28 The Mexican Defense Minister insists the military is not
the right instrument for the anti-drug cartel campaign.29 The Defense Minister
explains that the military is being used against the drug cartels to “chase
criminals,” which is a mission for the police.30 The Defense Minister also
claims it was a mistake to deploy the Mexican military against the drug cartels
in the first place.31 The Defense Minister has also implied that the military is
being used only because the Mexican police are so poorly trained.32 In other
words, an assessment of the poor capabilities of the police appears to be the
impetus for the use of the Mexican military against the drug cartels rather than
the nature of the threat posed by the drug cartels themselves.
B. Mexican Drug Cartels’ Organization
It is also necessary to understand how the drug cartels are organized to
properly analyze whether Mexican drug cartel violence is an armed conflict
under international law. In 2015, the Congressional Research Service identified
nine “major” Mexican drug cartels.33 These cartels generally appear to have an
organizational structure that reflects a tiered hierarchy.34 At the top of this
26

Id.
Paul Kan, The Border Wall: Making Mexican Drug Cartels Great Again, WAR ON THE ROCKS
(Feb. 2, 2017), https://warontherocks.com/2017/02/the-border-wall-making-mexican-drug-cartels-great-again/
(citation omitted).
28
Mexican Defense Minister: It’s “Unnatural” to Send the Military to Fight Drug Traffickers, BUS.
INSIDER (Dec. 9, 2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/afp-unnatural-for-mexican-military-to-fight-drugtrafficking-minister-2016-12.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Christopher Woody, Mexico’s Defense Chief: “We Have Committed Errors” in the War on Drugs,
BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 31, 2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/mexico-defense-chief-we-have-committederrors-in-drug-war-2016-3.
32
Mexican Defense Minister: It’s “Unnatural” to Send the Military to Fight Drug Traffickers, supra
note 28.
33
BEITTEL, supra note 1, at 13–26 (These “major” cartels are the: Tijuana/Arellano Felix Organization,
Sinaloa, Juárez/Carrillo Fuentes Organization, Gulf, Los Zetas, Beltrán Leyva Organization, La Familia
Michoacana, Knights Templar, and Cartel Jalisco-New Generation.).
34
Id.; see also Matt Dickenson, Leadership Transitions and Violence in Mexican Drug Trafficking
27
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hierarchy are the “bosses,” followed by “specialized operators such as lawyers
and accountants,” then come the “logistics operators,” and at the “lowest level
is the operative base, composed by drug dealers, drivers and drug
smugglers.”35 The exceptions to this common hierarchal structure are the
Sinaloa and Los Zetas drug cartels. The Sinaloa cartel is comprised of semiautonomous branches operating under a single top leader who can pool
together these branches when necessary.36 Los Zetas’ organization is believed
to be similar to a franchise, or affiliated independent cells, rather than the
classic tiered-hierarchy structure.37

II. APPLICABILITY OF IHL
Part II(A) examines the applicability of IHL generally. Part II(B) explains
why IHL is not applicable to the Mexican drug cartel violence discussed above
in Part I. Before proceeding, however, a cursory understanding of the
differences between IHL and IHRL is necessary. Their differences in the
treatment of taking lives and the arresting or imprisoning of individuals are the
most germane and illustrative. The use of force to take the life of an enemy
combatant is lawful as a first resort under IHL.38 IHL further accepts and even
expects such use of force will cause a certain amount of collateral damage,
including the death of innocent civilians.39 IHL also permits the detention of
combatants for the duration of hostilities40 or non-combatants when “the
security of the Detaining Power makes it absolutely necessary.”41 IHRL, on the
other hand, regulates the use of force to take a life as an “exceptional” measure
used only as a last resort in response to an imminent threat to the lives of
others.42 Arrest or imprisonment must be done on the basis of individualized,

Organizations, 2006–2010 (2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2001405
(extrapolating that the larger cartels will have a “somewhat more formal and hierarchical leadership structure”
by comparing the cartels to known Mexican criminal organizational structures).
35
GUERRERO-GUTIÉRREZ, supra note 21.
36
Dickenson, supra note 34.
37
BEITTEL, supra note 1.
38
1 JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW 3, 25 (2005), available at https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/publication/
pcustom.htm.
39
Id. at 46.
40
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War arts. 21 and 118, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Convention III].
41
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 42, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Convention IV].
42
See G.A. Res. 34/169, Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officers, art. 3, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/34/169 (Dec. 17, 1979).
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non-arbitrary judgment43 (i.e., conduct-based deprivations as opposed to IHL’s
status-based deprivations).44
A. Applicability of IHL Generally
Before analyzing IHL’s applicability to the Mexican drug cartel violence, it
is first necessary to discuss the application of IHL generally. IHL is applied in
the event of either an international armed conflict (IAC) or, in a more limited
manner, a non-international armed conflict (NIAC). An IAC exists if the
conditions of Article 2 common to all four Geneva Conventions (CA 2) are
satisfied.45 CA 2 requires either a declared war or an armed conflict between
two states.46 In the case of a NIAC, the conditions of Article 3 common to all
four Geneva Conventions (CA 3) must be fulfilled.47 CA 3 is trigged by an
“armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of
one of the High Contracting Parties.”48
The Geneva Conventions are universally adopted, thereby alleviating CA
3’s requirement that a NIAC occur “in the territory of one of the High
Contracting Parties.”49 It is also established that “not of an international
character” describes an armed conflict that is not between two states.50 Left
unsettled is the meaning of “armed conflict.” This section examines its
meaning as understood by (1) the International Committee of the Red Cross

43
See G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 9, U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10,
1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
44
Chris Jenks, Reimagining the Wheel: Detention and Release of Non-State Actors Under the
Geneva Conventions, in DETENTION OF NON-STATE ACTORS ENGAGED IN HOSTILITIES 93, 103 (Gregory
Rose & Bruce Oswald eds., 2016).
45
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces
in the Field art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6. U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Convention I]; Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed
Forces at Sea art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Convention II]; Convention III,
supra note 40, art. 2; Convention IV, supra note 41, art. 2 (Common Article 2); see How is the Term “Armed
Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law?, INT’L COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (Mar. 2008),
https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/opinion-paper-armed-conflict.pdf [hereinafter ICRC Armed
Conflict].
46
Convention I, supra note 45; Convention II, supra note 45; Convention III, supra note 40, art. 2;
Convention IV, supra note 41, art. 2.
47
Convention I, supra note 45, art. 3; Convention II, supra note 45, art. 3; Convention III, supra note
40, art. 3; Convention IV, supra note 41, art. 3.
48
Convention I, supra note 45, art. 3; Convention II, supra note 45, art. 3; Convention III, supra note
40, art. 3; Convention IV, supra note 41, art. 3.
49

Convention III, supra note 40, art. 3.

50

Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 562 (2006); ICRC Armed Conflict, supra note 45.
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(ICRC) commentary to CA 3;51 (2) Article 1 of Additional Protocol II of 1977
(AP II)52 and the ICRC’s commentary to AP II;53 and, (3) the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).
1. ICRC Commentary to CA 3
The ICRC has twice published commentaries to CA 3, once in 1952 and
again in 2016. The 2016 commentary references the 1952 commentary’s
criteria in addressing the threshold issue of identifying what violence triggers
CA 3’s applicability and otherwise largely discusses the international criminal
tribunals’ approach to this threshold issue.54 Because this Article similarly
addresses the international jurisprudence, its scope is limited to discussing the
1952 commentary.
The 1952 ICRC commentary explains that an “armed conflict” is not “a
mere act of banditry or an unorganized and short-lived insurrection.”55 The
ICRC’s commentary provides four non-binding criteria to help distinguish
between an armed conflict and these examples.56 The criteria are indicia of an
armed conflict and need not all be satisfied for an armed conflict to exist.
Taken together, the criteria suggest two predicate factual conditions for an
armed conflict to legally exist. First, the non-state actor’s violence is
endeavored upon (in whole or in part) to create a new or rival government to
the de jure government. Second, the violence has seized the international
community’s attention. The non-binding criteria are:
(1) That the Party in revolt against the de jure Government possesses
an organized military force, an authority responsible for its acts,
acting within a determinate territory and having the means of
respecting and ensuring respect for the Convention.
(2) That the legal Government is obliged to have recourse to the
regular military forces against insurgents organized as military and in
possession of a part of the national territory.
51
ICRC, 1 THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 COMMENTARY 49–50 (Jean S. Pictet ed.
1952), https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/GC_1949-I.pdf [hereinafter Pictet].
52
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) art.1, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, 611
[hereinafter Protocol II].
53
ICRC, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA
CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, 1307 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds. 1987), http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_
Law/pdf/Commentary_GC_Protocols.pdf [hereinafter Sandoz].
54
Treaties, States Parties and Commentaries, ICRC, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/full/GCicommentary (The 2016 commentaries are published electronically, side-by-side with the prior 1952 version).
55
Pictet, supra note 51, at 49.
56
Id. at 49–50.
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(3) (a) That the de jure Government has recognized the insurgents as
belligerents; or
(b) That it has claimed for itself the rights of a belligerent; or
(c) That it has accorded the insurgents recognition as belligerents for
the purposes only of the present Convention; or
(d) That the dispute has been admitted to the agenda of the Security
Council or the General Assembly of the United Nations as being a
threat to international peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of
aggression.
(4) (a) That the insurgents have an organization purporting to have
the characteristics of a State.
(b) That the insurgent civil authority exercises de facto authority over
persons within a determinate territory.
(c) That the armed forces act under the direction of the organized
civil authority and are prepared to observe the ordinary laws of war.
(d) That the insurgent civil authority agrees to be bound by the
provisions of the Convention.57

The existence of the first predicate condition—that the non-state actor is
using violence to create a rival government—is supported by criterion one,
criterion two, and subsections (a), (b), and (c) of criterion four. The use of
“means” within criterion one suggests the existence of a system or procedure
to adjudicate violations of the Convention. CA 3 explicitly prohibits the
sentencing of individuals for violations of the Conventions unless the sentence
is adjudged by a “regularly constituted court” capable of “affording all the
judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized
peoples.”58 Therefore, the first criterion is likely appropriating CA 3’s defined
judicial protections as indicia that an armed conflict legally exists in the first
place. The second criterion suggests the de jure government’s presence in part
of its national territory is only achieved through the exercise of military force
against the “insurgents”59 who are otherwise in control of that territory.
Subsection (a) of the fourth criterion requires the insurgents “have the
characteristics of a State.” The four characteristics of a state most commonly
accepted by international law are: (1) a permanent population; (2) a defined

57

Id.
Convention I, supra note 45, art. 3; Convention II, supra note 45, art. 3; Convention III, supra note
40, art. 3; Convention IV, supra note 41, art. 3.
59
An “insurgent” is defined as “[a] person fighting against a government or invading force; a rebel or
revolutionary.” Insurgent, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/
insurgent (last visited Nov. 13, 2017) (online edition). A “revolutionary” is defined as “[a] person who
advocates or engages in political revolution.” Revolutionary, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, https://en.
oxforddictionaries.com/definition/revolutionary (last visited Nov. 13, 2017) (online edition).
58
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territory; (3) a government; and (4) the ability to enter into relations with other
nations.60 Subsection (b) of the fourth criterion first establishes the non-state
actor’s “civil authority” as a point of consideration while subsection (c)
elevates the importance of considering the civil authority by subordinating the
insurgents’ military branch to its civil authority. Subsections (a), (b), and (c),
considered together, imply that the non-state actor is not only resisting the de
jure government’s civil and police authority but is also exercising civil
authority over a defined territory in a way that prejudices the de jure
government’s ability to do the same.
The second implied predicate condition—that the conflict has demanded
the international community’s attention—is evidenced by the third criterion
and subsections (c) and (d) of the fourth criterion. The third criterion requires
either the non-state actor party to the conflict to claim “belligerent” status or
that the state actor party to the conflict label them as such. This is tantamount
to recommending that a party to the conflict has invoked international law as
applicable. The third criterion also considers whether the U.N. Security
Council or General Assembly has taken notice of the violence as a “threat to
international peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression.”61
Subsections (c) and (d) of the fourth criterion suggest the non-state actor is
willing to both adhere to international law by “observ[ing] the ordinary laws of
war” and “be bound by the provisions of the [Geneva Conventions].”62 These
criteria suggest that the non-state actor’s struggle is, at least in part, to legally
enter and be recognized by the international community.
2. Additional Protocol II of 1977
A second authoritative source on the meaning of “armed conflict” is AP II.
Mexico and the United States are not parties to AP II, and AP II’s terms only
apply to territories of parties to the Protocol. Nonetheless, “[m]any provisions
of [AP II] can now be regarded as declaratory of existing rules or as having
crystallized emerging rules of customary law or else as having been strongly
instrumental in their evolution as general principles.”63 The U.S. Department
of Defense cites to AP II’s test for “[d]istinguishing Armed Conflict From

60
Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, opened for signature Dec. 26, 1933, 49
Stat. 3097, 165 L.N.T.S. 19.
61
Pictet, supra note 51, at 49–50.
62
Id.
63
Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on
Jurisdiction, para. 117 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
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Internal Disturbances and Tensions.”64 The United States also agrees that
customary international law is part of the larger corpus of the law of armed
conflict that the United States must obey.65 Therefore AP II’s definition of a
NIAC is very persuasive, if not authoritative.
AP II adopts a narrower definition of a NIAC by creating three
requirements in addition to CA 3’s. AP II requires that the conflict be between
“[1] armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups
which, [2] under responsible command, [3] exercise such control over a part of
its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military
operations and to implement [AP II].”66 Because AP II’s requirements are in
addition to, rather than in place of, CA 3’s, it is possible to have an armed
conflict for the purposes of CA 3 but not for AP II. Additionally, AP II rejects
“situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and
sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature” as being armed
conflicts.67 The ICRC commentary to AP II explains that “internal tensions”
can include “internal disturbances, without being an armed conflict, when the
State uses armed force to maintain order; there are internal tensions, without
being internal disturbances, when force is used as a preventive measure to
maintain respect for law and order.”68
AP II’s requirement for such control of territory permitting the
implementation of AP II’s provisions is its most significant additional
requirement. For example, Article 4 of AP II requires, inter alia, the non-state
actor to educate children in the territory under its control. 69 Article 5 requires,
inter alia, the non-state actor to maintain and operate detention facilities in
which males and females are housed separately to ensure that those detained
receive adequate medical treatment and spiritual assistance.70 Finally, Article 6
requires, inter alia, the non-state actor to set up a penal system with some
minimum levels of due process for the adjudication of crimes their detainees
may have committed.71 These requirements are illustrative of the tremendous
resources, organization, and commitment that is required of the non-state actor
64
U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LAW OF WAR MANUAL 83 (2016), https://www.
defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/DoD%20Law%20of%20War%20Manual%20-%20June%202015%20
Updated%20Dec%202016.pdf?ver=2016-12-13-172036-190.
65
Id. at 8.
66
Protocol II, supra note 52, art. 1.
67
Id.
68
Sandoz, supra note 53.
69
Protocol II, supra note 52, art. 4.
70
Id. art. 5.
71
Id. art. 6.
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to implement AP II. They also suggest that, for a NIAC to exist under AP II,
the non-state actor must exercise some competence in governing people within
a territory.
3. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
A third authoritative source for defining “armed conflict” is international
case law developed by the ICTY. The ICTY Appeals Chamber in The
Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić (Tadić) found a CA 3 “armed conflict exists
whenever there is . . . protracted armed violence between governmental
authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a
State.”72 Subsequent treatment of “protracted” has turned on measuring the
“intensity” of the conflict.73 For example, the Tadić Trial Chamber focused “on
two aspects of a conflict; the intensity of the conflict and the organization of
the parties to the conflict.”74 These “intensity” and “organization” prongs are
used to legally differentiate an internal disturbance from an armed conflict.75
Tadić also offers “terrorist activities” as a third example of what is not an
“armed conflict” but otherwise fails to identify the thresholds that satisfy its
two-prong test. The Tadić Trial Chamber commends the ICRC commentary’s
non-binding criteria (discussed above) as relevant to making this threshold
determination on a case-by-case basis. The Tadić tribunal noted the following
circumstances as relevant to its finding that an “armed conflict” legally existed
in Yugoslavia: the conflict was between organized political parties; the party in
“revolt against the de jure government” controlled territory; the violence was
protracted and involved “artillery bombardments” that lasted up to three days
at a time, resulting in the whole destruction of villages; and the intensity of the
violence “ensured the continuous involvement of the Security Council.”76
These circumstances seem to mirror consideration of the ICRC commentary’s
non-binding criteria.
After Tadić, in the 2005 case Prosecutor v. Fatmir Limaj, the ICTY Trial
Chamber noted that the ICRC commentary’s criteria are non-binding and
instead relied on other factors indicative of the “intensity of a conflict and the
72
Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Judgment of the Appeals Chamber, para. 70 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
73
Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Judgment of the Trial Chamber, para. 562 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997); see also Abella v. Argentina (Tablada Base Case), Case
11.137, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report 55/97, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, doc. 7 rev. (1997).
74
Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Judgment of the Trial Chamber, para. 562.
75
Id.
76
Id. paras. 563–68.
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organization of the parties.”77 The court explained that these factors relate to
“factual matters which need to be decided in light of the particular evidence
and on a case-by-case basis.”78 In the 2012 Prosecutor v. Ramush Haradinaj,
Idriz Balaj, and Lahi Brahimaj (Brahimaj) decision, the ICTY Trial Chamber
cited a list of factors the ICTY had developed since Limaj to “assess the
intensity” of a conflict.79 These factors include:
the distribution of weapons among both parties to the conflict;
involvement of the UN Security Council; number of civilians forced
to flee from the combat zones; types of weapons used, particularly
heavy weapons, and other military equipment, such as tanks and
other heavy vehicles; the blockading or besieging of towns and heavy
shelling of towns; the extent of destruction and number of casualties
caused by shelling or fighting; the quantity of troops and units
deployed; existence and change of front lines between the parties; the
occupation of territory, towns and villages; the deployment of
government forces to the crisis area; closure of roads; cease fire
orders and agreements.80

In applying these factors to the facts before it, the Brahimaj tribunal
notably held that despite the “shelling of villages,” the requisite level of
“intensity” had not been satisfied and therefore there was legally no “armed
conflict” during the time relevant to the tribunal’s consideration.81 These
factors, considering the manner that the Brahimaj tribunal applied them,
suggest the “intensity” prong is a high bar to overcome.
In the 2008 ICTY case Prosecutor v. Ljube Boškoski and Johan
Tarculovski (Boškoski), the ICTY reviewed how the “organizational” prong
must be considered. Boškoski articulates five different factors for
consideration: (1) whether the group is organized into a military command
structure (e.g., squad, platoon, company, battalion, brigade); (2) whether the
group is able to conduct operations in an organized manner; (3) whether the
group has a logistical capacity to support military operations; (4) whether the
group has an internal disciplinary system and the ability to adhere to IHL; and
(5) whether the group can “speak with one voice.”82 These factors suggest a
77
Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment of the Trial Chamber, paras. 85, 90 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2005).
78
Id.
79
Prosecutor v. Haradinaj (Brahimaj), Case No. IT-04-84bis-T, Judgment of the Trial Chamber, para.
394 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 29, 2012).
80
Id.
81
Id. paras. 404, 410–11 (emphasis added).
82
Prosecutor v. Boškoski (Boškoski), Case No. IT-04-82-T, Judgment of the Trial Chamber, paras.
199–203 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 10, 2008), aff’d, Boškoski et al., IT-04-82-T,
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lower bar for the “organization” prong because they largely do not require
actual organizational fidelity but merely require the potential to do so—for
example, the “ability to determine a unified military strategy” rather than
having actually determined a unified military strategy.83
B. Application of IHL to Mexican Drug Cartel Violence
The above authorities guide the analysis of IHL’s applicability to Mexican
drug cartel violence. First, it is evident that Mexican drug cartel violence is
“not of an international character” as the conflict is not between two states.
The issue remains whether the violence is an “armed conflict.” Part (1) of this
section applies the ICRC commentary to CA 3’s analysis to the facts
concerning the Mexican drug cartel violence. Part (2) is an AP II analysis of
the drug cartel violence. Part (3) is a comparison of the drug cartel violence to
the ICTY’s treatment. Part (4) compares the drug cartel violence to the
examples of what is not an “armed conflict”.
1. Application of ICRC’s Commentary to CA 3
There is no evidence that satisfies the ICRC criteria’s first predicate
condition: that the non-state actor is attempting, through violence, to create a
new or rival government to the de jure government. For example, the drug
cartels have not established a system of justice to ensure their conduct is in
accordance with CA 3. The drug cartels do not possess territory over which
they exercise civil authority, nor do the drug cartels purport to have any of the
characteristics of a state. Lastly, Mexican military officials do not feel
“obliged” to respond to the drug cartels with military force. Some may argue
otherwise, pointing to the actual use of Mexican military against the cartels as
evidence that it is so “obliged.” The Defense Minister’s statements largely
characterizing the use of the military against the drug cartels as a folly weigh
heavily against this argument. The statements are persuasive evidence that
Mexico is not bound by the circumstances to use its military but has instead
chosen to do so only for practical expediency. Therefore, the first, second, and
fourth ICRC criteria, as applied here, suggest that the violence is not an armed
conflict.
The second predicate condition—that the conflict has demanded the
international community’s attention—is similarly left unsatisfied by the facts.

Judgement of the Appeals Chamber, para. 23 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 19, 2010).
83
Boškoski, Case No. IT-04-82-T, Judgment of the Trial Chamber, para. 200.

NEELY_GALLEYPROOFS2

2018]

2/1/2018 3:27 PM

GOOD LAW FOR BAD HOMBRES

269

The violence has not entered the international plane. No party is reported as
declaring the drug cartels “belligerents.” Neither the U.N. General Assembly
nor U.N. Security Council is involved with the Mexican drug cartel violence,
and the drug cartels have evidenced no willingness to observe IHL.
Reference to the ICRC commentary therefore suggests that the Mexican
drug cartel violence is not a NIAC. It follows that IHL would not be
applicable. Yet, the ICRC commentary is persuasive but not controlling
authority. It is therefore worthwhile to continue the analysis of whether an
armed conflict exists in Mexico.
2. Application of AP II
The first two requirements of AP II are satisfied by the facts surrounding
the Mexican drug cartel violence. First, the violence is, at least in part, between
a state actor and a non-state actor. Second, the drug cartels’ organizational
hierarchy satisfies the “responsible command structure” requirement. With
respect to the third criterion, the coordinated and, at times, successful nature of
the “shootouts” against the Mexican military demonstrates the cartels’ ability
to carry out sustained and concerted military operations. Nonetheless, the third
criterion is not satisfied, as the cartels have not exercised such control over
territory to implement the requirements of AP II.84 For example, there is no
indication that the drug cartels can perform the functions concerning the
education of children, the detention of prisoners, the medical treatment of
prisoners, or the establishment of a penal system. As one report from Mexico
poignantly stated, “none interviewed could point to a single public work,
school or hospital built or funded by [a drug cartel kingpin].”85 The elements
for finding an “armed conflict” pursuant to AP II are not all satisfied, and the
application of IHL to the violence would be baseless within the AP II
framework.
3. Comparison to ICTY’s Treatment of CA 3
An examination of the ICTY’s jurisprudence concerning CA 3 confirms
the conclusion that there is not an armed conflict in Mexico. Consider the
Tadić test where both the “intensity of the conflict and the organization of the

84

Protocol II, supra note 52.
Deborah Bonello, In His Hometown, Fugitive Mexican Drug Lord ‘El Chapo’ is a Hero to Many,
L.A. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/world/mexico-americas/la-fg-mexico-culiacan-guzman20150810-story.html.
85

NEELY_GALLEYPROOFS2

270

2/1/2018 3:27 PM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

parties to the conflict” determine the existence of an “armed conflict.”86 First,
the “organization” prong, as clarified by Boškoski,87 is satisfied by the “major”
drug cartels. The “intensity” prong, however, is not satisfied. Having already
referenced the ICRC’s commentary as recommended by Tadić, attention must
next be given to the Tadić progeny’s treatment of “intensity.”
The balance of the Brahimaj factors weigh in favor of finding the Mexican
drug cartel violence does not satisfy the “intensity” prong. Although the
violence has exacted significant numbers of casualties and many troops have
been engaged, the remaining considerations cut in the other direction. For
example, the military is calling for a reduced (if not eliminated) role; neither
the U.N. Security Council nor the General Assembly are involved in the
situation; the use of artillery, tanks, and other heavy vehicles is not reported;
towns are not besieged; towns are not shelled; “front lines” are not established
and changed; and there are no ceasefire orders and agreements. No single
Brahimaj factor is required to answer the threshold question, and an
international tribunal considering their aggregate weight would find the
balance in favor of determining that the Mexican drug cartel violence is an
internal disturbance. The ICTY jurisprudence, therefore, also suggests IHL is
not applicable.
4. Comparison to Negative Examples of an “Armed Conflict”
The Mexican drug cartel violence is also more akin to the examples of
what is not an armed conflict. Specifically, as noted above, banditry,
unorganized or short-lived insurrections, acts of terrorism, and situations of
internal disturbances and tensions cannot legally be considered “armed
conflicts.” Banditry is the plural of bandit, or “a robber or outlaw belonging to
a gang and typically operating in an isolated or lawless area.”88 An
“insurrection” is “[t]he action of rising in arms or open resistance against
established authority or governmental restraint . . . .”89 Mexican drug cartel
violence is centered on creating lawlessness and is therefore similar to the
disavowed “banditry.” On the other hand, the drug cartel violence is organized
and protracted—it is directed at the government and also occurs between the

86

Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Judgment of the Trial Chamber, para. 562.
Boškoski Trial Chamber, Case No. IT-04-82-T, Judgment of the Trial Chamber, paras. 199–203.
88
Bandit, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/bandit (last
visited Nov. 13, 2017) (online edition).
89
Insurrection, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/
insurrection (last visited Nov. 13, 2017) (online edition).
87
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drug cartels. In this light, the drug cartel violence might be an “armed conflict”
as compared to the “short-lived insurrection” example.
The “terrorist activities” example given by Tadić appears to lend more
credibility to the conclusion that the drug violence is not legally an armed
conflict.90 Yet using “terrorist activities” for comparison purposes is nebulous
for two reasons: first, because “terrorism” is widely defined, and second,
because the U.S. War on Terror might contradict the premise that “terrorist
activities” are still a valid example of what is not an armed conflict.
Nonetheless, two international instruments have defined terrorism and serve as
persuasive authorities for how “terrorism” is understood by international law.
First, the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism in 1999, to which 188 states are parties, defines terrorism as:
act[s] intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or
to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a
situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its
nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a
government or an international organization to do or to abstain from
doing any act.91

Second, U.N. Security Council Resolution 1566 defines terrorism as:
[c]riminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent
to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the
purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group
of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a
government or an international organization to do or to abstain from
doing any act, which constitute offences within the scope of and as
defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to
terrorism . . . .92

Using these definitions, the pattern of drug cartel violence trending towards
the sort characterized as “mafia ridden” suggests the violence is not an “armed
conflict.” Instead, the drug cartel violence is understood as intending to
“intimidate [the Mexican] population” or to “compel [the Mexican]
government . . . to abstain from [enforcing its drug laws].”93 In this respect, the
drug cartel violence is the same kind of violence associated with terrorism as

90

Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Judgment of the Trial Chamber, para. 562.
Int’l Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism art. 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/109
(Dec. 9, 1999).
92
S.C. Res.1566, ¶ 3 (Oct. 8, 2004).
93
See id.
91
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defined by the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing
of Terrorism and Security Council Resolution 1566.
Additionally, the U.S. War on Terror provides counterexamples of when
terrorist activities can be considered part in parcel to an “armed conflict,” but it
does not operate to entirely discredit the use of “terrorist activities” as an
example of what an armed conflict is not. The War on Terror is distinguishable
from the Mexican drug cartel violence in at least two ways. First, the Mexican
drug cartel violence presents a transnational issue, whereas the War on Terror
presents an international issue.94 Second, the United States and Al Qaeda have
each recognized the existence of an armed conflict between each other.95 The
use of the “terrorist activities” example therefore supports the conclusion that
the drug cartel violence is not an armed conflict.
Lastly, consideration of AP II’s proscription of “situations of internal
disturbances and tensions” from being a legal armed conflict96 confirms the
conclusions that there is no NIAC in Mexico. The drug cartel’s violence is
intended to deconstruct law-abiding behavior in Mexico so that illicit business
may succeed. This has created a strained state between the proponents of this
lawlessness, the cartels, and Mexico. Furthermore, and as noted above, the
ICRC’s commentary to AP II establishes that the military forces may be used
in certain instances to maintain respect for law and order without violence
being considered an armed conflict.97 Mexican military officials’ statements
demonstrate the use of the military as a law enforcement tool against
“criminals.” The Mexican drug cartel violence, although significant, is
consequently a Mexican “internal disturbance.”

94
See S.C. Res. 1377 (Nov. 12, 2001) (“Transnational issue” used here means the drug cartel violence
is embedded in Mexico but at times transcends its borders, whereas “international issue” used here means it
has seized the attention of the U.N. Security Council and therefore exists on a level above the states as
independent sovereigns).
95
See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Dominic Tierney, The Twenty Years’ War, THE
ATLANTIC (Aug. 23, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/08/twenty-years-war/
496736/; see also Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
96
Protocol II, supra note 52, art. 1.
97
Sandoz, supra note 53, at 1319–1320.
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III. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
Although IHL should not govern the conduct of a potential U.S. military
intervention into Mexican drug cartel violence, the United States still has legal
obligations under IHRL. The United States is a party to seventeen human
rights treaties.98 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), however, is the most relevant. Part III(A) considers the application
of the ICCPR to the potential use of military force in Mexico. Part III(B)
considers the implications of the United States signing (but not ratifying) the
American Convention on Human Rights (American Convention). Finally, Part
III(C) considers human rights as customary international law.
A. The ICCPR
The ICCPR articulates several individual human rights. Article 6(1)
promulgates a non-derogable right to life comprised of three separate, but
related, conditions: (1) everyone has the right to life; (2) that right must be
protected by law; and (3) no one can be arbitrarily deprived of life.99 Article
6(1) thus establishes a foundational right to life that is mutually supported by a
“positive obligation” of governments to protect that right and a “negative
obligation” preventing that right from being arbitrarily taken. With respect to
rights concerning arrest or imprisonment, Article 9 provides that “[e]veryone
has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to
arbitrary arrest or detention.”100 Therefore, the ICCPR constrains the U.S.
military in Mexico to not arbitrarily: (1) take life; and (2) arrest or imprison
people. The U.S. executive branch does not, however, share this conclusion, as
discussed above.
The ICCPR also provides for how these rights will be ensured by the
treaty’s parties. Article 2(1) states “[e]ach State Party to the present Covenant
undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and
subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant . . . .”101
Article 5(1) qualifies the general statement of Article 2(1) by providing:
[n]othing in the present Covenant may be interpreted as implying for
any State . . . any right to engage in any activity or perform any act
98

Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties - USA, UNIV. MINN. HUM. RTS. LIBR.,

http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/research/ratification-USA.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2017).
99
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) arts. 4(2) and 6(1), Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171.
100
Id. art. 9(1).
101
Id. art. 2(1).
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aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms recognized
herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in
the present Covenant.102

In other words, Article 2(1) creates an affirmative obligation to protect
human rights within the United States’ territory and jurisdiction while
Article 5(1) prohibits the United States from taking actions that destroy the
rights of anyone beyond the United States’ territory and jurisdiction. The
Human Rights Committee (HRC),103 in General Comment Thirty-One,
similarly concluded:
Parties are required by article 2, paragraph 1, to respect and to ensure
the Covenant . . . . This principle also applies to those within the
power or effective control of the forces of a State Party acting outside
its territory, regardless of the circumstances in which such power or
effective control was obtained, such as forces constituting a national
contingent of a State Party assigned to an international peace-keeping
or peace-enforcement operation.104

The U.S. government’s executive branch rejects the legal conclusion
that the ICCPR imposes limits on its extraterritorial actions.105 In March
2014, before the HRC, the United States affirmed the position it has held
since 1995: “the [ICCPR] applies only to individuals both within its
territory and within its jurisdiction . . . .”106 In November 2014, the United
States moved closer to, but not congruent with, the HRC’s effective control
test when it announced that its obligations under the Convention Against
Torture (as opposed to the ICCPR) “apply in places outside the United
States that the U.S. government controls as a governmental authority.”107

102

Id. art. 5(1).
Id. Part IV details the make and functions of the Human Rights Committee. Id. arts. 28–45. The
drafting and promulgating general comments regarding the ICCPR is not necessarily an obvious function of
the committee from the articles of the ICCPR; the Committee has nonetheless made it a practice. Off. of the
U.N. High Comm’r for Hum. Rts., Civil and Political Rights, Factsheet No. 15 (Rev. 1) 15 (2005), http://www.
ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet15rev.1en.pdf.
104
U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment 31, The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed
on States Parties to the Covenant, art. 2(1), CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add13.
105
Charlie Savage, U.S., Rebuffing U.N., Maintains Stance That Rights Treaty Does Not Apply Abroad,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/14/world/us-affirms-stance-that-rights-treatydoesnt-apply-abroad.html.
106
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Mary McLeod, Acting Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State).
107
Press Release, Bernadette Meehan, Spokesperson, National Security Council, U.S. Presentation to the
Committee Against Torture (Nov. 12, 2014), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/
12/statement-nsc-spokesperson-bernadette-meehan-us-presentation-committee-a.
103
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Using either of the executive branch’s interpretations, the U.S. military
would not be constrained by either IHL or IHRL in Mexico and, thus, legally
free to arbitrarily kill or arrest and imprison Mexicans. In the face of a
manifestly absurd or unreasonable interpretation of a treaty, Article 32 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides recourse to
“supplementary means of interpretation” of a treaty’s text.108 In 2010, the
Office of the Legal Adviser at the Department of State drafted a legal opinion
that did resort to supplementary means of interpretation.109 In this opinion, the
Legal Adviser concluded that, in light of “(1) the [ICCPR’s] language in
context; (2) object and purpose; (3) negotiating history; (4) U.S. positions; (5)
interpretations of other States Parties; (6) interpretations of the Human Rights
Committee; and (7) ICJ rulings,”110 the United States is obligated to “respect
rights under its control in circumstances in which the [United States] exercises
authority or effective control over a particular person or context without regard
to territory.”111 Should the issue become justiciable, the 2010 Legal Adviser’s
Opinion presents a strong argument that is supported by the HRC’s General
Comment Thirty-One. Furthermore, a plain reading of ICCPR’s Articles 2(1)
and 5(1) support concluding that the ICCPR has (at least some) extraterritorial
regulatory effect. It is therefore likely a Court would find the U.S. military
bound by the ICCPR to respect the human rights of individuals in Mexico who
find themselves under the U.S. military’s effective control.
B. The American Convention
The American Convention separately sets forth binding IHRL obligations.
These obligations often mirror those traced to the ICCPR. For example, Article
4(1) of the American Convention states: “Every person has the right to have
his life respected. This right shall be protected by law and, in general, from the
moment of conception. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.”112

108
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 32, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT]; The United States is not a party to this treaty but considers it representative
of customary international law. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.
state.gov/s/l/treaty/faqs/70139.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2017).
109
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE OFF. OF THE LEGAL ADVISER, MEMORANDUM OPINION ON THE GEOGRAPHIC
SCOPE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS (2010), https://www.
documentcloud.org/documents/1053853-state-department-iccpr-memo.html [hereinafter DEP’T OF STATE
LEGAL ADVISER].
110
Id.
111
Id. (emphasis omitted).
112
American Convention on Human Rights art. 4(1), Nov. 21, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143.
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Convention Article 7(3) provides, inter alia, that “[n]o one shall be subject to
arbitrary arrest or imprisonment.”113
Mexico is a party to the American Convention.114 The United States has
signed, but has not ratified, the American Convention, and therefore has a
customary international legal obligation to not defeat the treaty’s object and
purpose.115 There are several tests used to determine whether a state has
defeated the object and purpose of a treaty. By almost every measure discussed
below, the United States cannot take action that the American Convention
prohibits Mexico from taking without defeating the American Convention’s
object and purpose.
The first measure is the “essential elements test,” which requires a
signatory to “comply with the most important parts” of the treaty.116 It cannot
be successfully argued that the right to not have your life arbitrarily taken and
the right to be free from arbitrary arrest and imprisonment are not “important
parts” of the American Convention. Every other right a person might enjoy
under the American Convention presupposes they are alive and free to enjoy it.
Therefore, these two rights are “important parts” of the treaty, and the United
States taking action that violates their protections would defeat the object and
purpose of the American Convention.
A second test is the “impossible performance test.” This test holds that the
“object and purpose is defeated if subsequent performance of the treaty
becomes impossible or ‘meaningless.’”117 If a state arbitrarily kills an
individual, then performance of the treaty vis-à-vis that individual is
impossible because the right to life is an individual human right rather than a
collective right. The same cannot be said with respect to arbitrary arrest or
imprisonment because the individual who is arbitrarily arrested or imprisoned
can be subsequently released and, thus, performance of the treaty remains
possible.
The final two tests are similar and worth discussing at once. They are the
“bad faith test” and the “manifest intent test.” The “bad faith test” holds that “a

113

Id. art. 7(3).
American Convention on Human Rights “Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica” (B-32), ORG. AM. STATES,
http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_B-32_American_Convention_on_Human_Rights_sign.htm (last visited
Nov. 13, 2017).
115
Id.; VCLT, supra note 108.
116
David S. Jonas & Thomas N. Sanders, The Object and Purpose of a Treaty: Three Interpretive
Methods, 43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 565, 596 (2010).
117
Id. at 598.
114
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state violates [the object and purpose of a treaty] if its actions are unwarranted
or condemnable, while under the manifest intent test, the actions need only
‘seem unwarranted and condemnable . . . regardless of actual proof of bad
faith.’”118 With respect to the “bad faith test,” it is difficult to imagine how the
use of military force to arbitrarily kill and arrest or imprison individuals for
prolonged periods would be done in good faith. The bad faith test would
therefore likely find actions taken to kill and arrest or imprison drug cartel
members, on the sole basis of their membership in a drug cartel, as running
afoul of the object and purpose of the American Convention. Under the
“manifest intent test,” the use of military force outside the context of an armed
conflict to arbitrarily kill and detain Mexicans would seem unwarranted and
condemnable and are, thus, repugnant to the object and purpose of the
American Convention.
Some may argue, however, that the “bad faith” and the “manifest intent”
tests conclude the opposite. This argument would be premised on a belief that
there is a legitimate security basis for killing or arresting and imprisoning drug
cartel members given the nature of their criminal activity and the threat they
pose. The argument would follow that using lethal force against or arresting
and imprisoning drug cartel members is therefore not arbitrary or in bad faith.
This argument hinges on whether a state’s legitimate security basis satisfies the
American Convention’s proscription against the “arbitrary” taking of life and
the “arbitrary arrest or imprisonment.”
This argument fails on its face with respect to the American Convention’s
non-derogable right to life. Article 27(1) of the American Convention
disavows any legitimate security basis for the suspension of the right to life.119
In other words, the U.S. military cannot have a good faith basis to use lethal
force in Mexico against drug cartel members solely because of their
membership in a drug cartel. The only good faith basis under the American
Convention for using lethal force is if a drug cartel member presents an
imminent threat to others (i.e., just because that individual has violated the law
does not give license to the United States to use lethal force).
With respect to arbitrary arrest or imprisonment of an individual, pursuant
to Articles 27(1) and 27(2) of the American Convention, an arrest or
imprisonment based on an individual’s membership in a drug cartel (as
opposed to their suspected violation of the law) can only be done in good faith
118
Id. at 602 (quoting Jan Klabbers, How to Defeat a Treaty’s Object and Purpose Pending Entry into
Force: Toward Manifest Intent, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 283, 330 (2001)).
119
American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 112, arts. 27(1), 27(2).
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if there is a nexus between the arrest or imprisonment and exigent
circumstances that threaten the “independence or security” of Mexico.120
Given the context, it is likely that the United States would argue that the drug
cartel members threaten the “security” of Mexico. Convention Article 27(2)’s
coordinated conjunction between “independence” and “security” (i.e., the
independence and security of Mexico are equally important) requires, however,
that the security risk be comparable in gravity to the loss of Mexico’s
continued independence. As established above in Part II(B), the Mexican drug
cartels present a significant security risk but not to the extent that they threaten
the independence of Mexico. It is therefore unlikely that this argument would
succeed as applied to derogations of the right to be free from arbitrary arrest or
imprisonment. If, however, the arrest or imprisonment of individuals was not
arbitrary (i.e., based on their suspected conduct in violation of established law
rather than on their membership in a drug cartel), then the U.S. military would
likely be acting in compliance with IHRL and not frustrating the object and
purpose of the American Convention.
C. Customary International Law
In addition to the treaty law, there is a body of “customary international
law” that would control U.S. military conduct in Mexico.121 Customary
international law is created through the practice of states and opinio juris (state
practices are implemented because states believe they are required by
international law). A state may not be required to observe customary
international law if the state has been a “persistent objector.”122 To qualify as a
persistent objector, a state must have dissented from a practice as that practice
ripened into customary international law.123 Once the practice subsequently
matures into customary international law, any state that persistently objected to
it is exempt from it.124

120

Id. (emphasis added).
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J.
14, ¶ 178 (June 27).
122
Ted L. Stein, The Approach of the Different Drummer: The Principle of the Persistent Objector in
International Law, 26 HARV. INT’L L.J. 457, 458 (1985).
123
Id. (“A state that has persistently objected to a rule is not bound by it, so long as the objection was
made manifest during the process of the rule’s emergence.”).
124
Id.
121
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The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is accepted,125 at
least in relevant part, as articulating customary international law.126 Article 3 of
the UDHR states simply, and without territorial limitations, “[e]veryone has
the right to life, liberty and security of person.”127 It is well established that, as
a corollary to this right, it is a violation of customary international human
rights law for a state to carry out extrajudicial killings unless as a necessary act
in exigent circumstances—for example, a police officer acting in self-defense
of himself or others.128 Article 9 of the UDHR prohibits the arbitrary arrest or
detention of any individual.129 Customary international human rights law has
accordingly been interpreted as prohibiting detention of individuals in a
manner “incompatible with the principles of justice or with the dignity of the
human person.”130
The U.S. opposition to extraterritorial application of the ICCPR could be
argued to make the United States a persistent objector to the extraterritorial
application of the ICCPR’s obligations that can also be traced to customary
international human rights law. Assuming arguendo that the U.S. objection to
extraterritorial application of treaty-based human rights law is relevant for
purposes of becoming a persistent objector to customary international human
rights law, the argument still fails because the United States has not been
persistent in its objections. In 1980, the United States filed a brief, as amicus
curiae, in the matter of Filartiga v. Pena-Irala before the Second Circuit,
arguing that “certain fundamental human rights are now guaranteed to
individuals as a matter of customary international law.”131 In 1980, the United
States also filed a written proceeding in the Case Concerning United States
Diplomatic & Consular Staff in Tehran before the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) arguing that states must “respect and observe” the rights
enumerated in the UDHR and “corresponding portions of the [ICCPR]” for
“nationals and aliens alike.”132 In the same brief, the United States specifically

125
Digital Record of the UDHR, U.N. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS. (Feb. 2009),
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NEWSEVENTS/Pages/DigitalrecordoftheUDHR.aspx (explaining that the UDHR
has “become the international standard of human rights.”).
126
Richard Lillich, The Growing Importance of Customary International Human Rights Law, 25 GA. J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 2 (1995).
127
UDHR, supra note 43, art. 3.
128
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 702 (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
129
UDHR, supra note 43, art. 9.
130
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 702 (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
131
Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae, at 6, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d
Cir. 1980) (No. 79-6090).
132
Memorial of the Government of the United States of America, Case Concerning U.S. Diplomatic &
Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1982 I.C.J. Pleadings 121, 182 (Jan. 12, 1980).
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identified Articles 3 and 9 of the UDHR as deserving such treatment by
states.133 Additionally, between 1980 and 1993, three separate U.S. federal
courts found the UDHR to be “an authoritative statement of customary
international law.”134
Furthermore, the first time the United States made any objection to
extraterritorial treaty-based application of human rights law was in 1995.135
The 2010 Office of Legal Adviser’s memo, discussed above in Part III(A),
illustrates that the United States did not object to extraterritorial application of
the ICCPR “(1) at the time of signature and transmittal of the Covenant in
1978; (2) upon Senate advice and consent to the Covenant in 1991, or (3) at the
time [sic] ratification in 1992.”136 In 1994, having occasion to do so, the
United States again failed to make a territorial objection in its report to the
HRC concerning the applicability of the ICCPR.137 The United States, having
come late to its position on the matter, cannot now avail itself of “persistent
objector” status to the existence of customary international law that it accepted
as early as 1980.
IV. PRESIDENT’S DUTY TO OBEY IHRL
The U.S. Constitution requires the President to “take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed.”138 The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution makes
treaties the supreme law of the land.139 The President therefore has a
constitutional duty to direct the military in a manner that conforms to treatybased human rights law.140 The President is additionally bound by customary
international human rights in two respects. Part IV(A) discusses the President’s
obligation to faithfully execute customary international human rights law
generally. Part IV(B) discusses the U.S. Constitution’s structural bounds, or
lack thereof, on the President’s authority to order the military to act against
Mexican drug cartels in a manner that violates customary international human
rights law.
133

Id. n. 36.
Phaidin v. U.S, 28 Fed. Cl. 231, 234 (Fed. Cl. 1993); see also Siderman de Blake v. Republic of
Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 719 (9th Cir. 1992); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 882 (2d Cir. 1980).
135
DEP’T OF STATE LEGAL ADVISER, supra note 109, at 30.
136
Id. at 25.
137
Id. at 29.
138
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
139
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
140
But see Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 508 (2008) (holding Article 94 of the U.N. Charter was not
self-executing and thus not judicially enforceable by Article III courts whereas the present issue concerns the
duty to faithfully execute under Article II).
134

NEELY_GALLEYPROOFS2

2018]

2/1/2018 3:27 PM

GOOD LAW FOR BAD HOMBRES

281

A. Duty to Faithfully Execute Customary International Human Rights Law
Applications of the U.S. Constitution’s Take Care Clause requirements to
customary international human rights law are nuanced. The “law” the Take
Care Clause charges the President with faithfully executing is left unqualified
by the Clause’s text. Elsewhere, however, the U.S. Constitution’s text twice
qualifies its use of the word “law.” Article I recognizes both the “Law of the
Nations” (customary international law) and “the Laws of the Union.”141 Thus,
a plain reading of the U.S. Constitution requires the President to faithfully
execute all law, including customary international law, because the Take Care
Clause’s textual use of “law” is left general, whereas elsewhere the
constitutional text qualifies the general with the specific.
The Take Care Clause’s drafting history supports this conclusion. An early
draft of the Clause included a qualifier that care be taken only with respect to
“national laws.”142 Subsequent draft language qualified the Take Care Clause
as only applicable to “the laws of the United States.”143 This qualifier was
subsequently deleted and the final adopted version simply read “take Care that
the Laws be faithfully executed.”144
The courts have also concluded that customary international law is part of
U.S. domestic law. In 1900, the U.S. Supreme Court held in The Paquete
Habana that customary international law is U.S. law where “there is no treaty
and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision.”145 This
holding confirms customary international law is part of U.S. federal common
law but also suggests the President or Congress can violate it through some
other exercise of power.146 Customary international law as a part of U.S.
domestic law is therefore a “gap” filler to be applied when no other controlling
law exists.147 It would appear, then, that customary international law is part of
Article II’s Take Care Clause but not part of Article VI’s Supremacy Clause.148

141
142

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
1 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS

OF THE

FEDERAL CONVENTION

OF

1787, at 63 (Max Farrand ed.,

1911).
143

2 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 185 (Max Farrand ed.,

1911).
144

Id. at 660.
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
146
See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630
F.2d 876, 880-81 (2d Cir. 1980) (explaining that customary international law is a surviving vestige of federal
common law following Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)).
147
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 111 (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
148
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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It follows that the President, otherwise bound to faithfully execute
customary international law by operation of the Supremacy Clause, must have
a countervailing constitutional authority for taking executive action to displace
customary international law. Three circuit courts have generally adopted this
conclusion.149 The U.S. Supreme Court, in Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, suggested that the President’s constitutional authority as chief
executive of foreign affairs could supersede any duty to faithfully execute
customary international law.150 Sabbatino explains that the chief executive
authority vests the President with a responsibility not only to simply interpret
customary international law, but also to advocate for changes in customary
international law when he believes it is necessary to do so.151 The argument
would follow that the advocacy role permits the President to take unilateral
action (i.e., without congressional approval) that violates customary
international law as part of a bid to create or change customary international
law to benefit the nation.
The argument is misapplied in this instance because the rights to life and to
be free from prolonged arbitrary detention are each considered jus cogens.152
The norms of jus cogens are “accepted and recognized by the international
community as a norm from which no derogation is permitted.”153 Thus, the
rights to life and to be free from arbitrary detention are not malleable
customary international human rights laws. It is therefore beyond the
President’s unilateral authority, assuming arguendo it exists at all, to violate
these norms under the pretense of shaping customary international law.
B.

Constitutional Structural Limits on Presidential Power

The U.S. Constitution places structural constraints on the exercise of
presidential authority. In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, Justice
Jackson issued an influential concurring opinion to assess presidential power
through a tri-partite analysis, which divides presidential power into three
categories based on what Congress has or has not done.154 Category one
includes presidential acts taken pursuant to an expressed or implied

149
See, e.g., Barrera-Echavarria v. Rison, 44 F.3d 1441, 1451 (9th Cir. 1995); Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788
F.2d 1446, 1454–55 (11th Cir. 1986); Gisbert v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 988 F.2d 1437, 1448 (5th Cir. 1993).
150
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 432–33.
151
Id.
152
Jus cogens are principles that form the norms of international law that cannot be set aside.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 702 (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
153
Jus Cogens, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
154
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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authorization of Congress. When acting in this category, the President has
maximum authority.155 Category two presidential actions are done in the
absence Congress’s approval or denial. This is a “gray” area of presidential
authority.156 Category three are presidential actions incompatible with the
expressed or implied will of Congress.157 This is the lowest presidential
authority and, to be constitutional, it must be only “his own constitutional
powers minus any specific constitutional powers of Congress over the
matter.”158
While it is true that “the source of the President’s power to act in foreign
affairs does not enjoy any textual detail, the historical gloss on the ‘executive
Power’ vested in Article II of the Constitution has recognized the President’s
‘vast share of responsibility for the conduct of our foreign relations.’”159
Nonetheless, unilaterally ordering the U.S. military to Mexico to address the
drug cartels would encroach upon the exclusive Article I congressional
authority to regulate foreign commerce,160 as well as the following shared
constitutional powers: the war powers;161 the power to send ambassadors;162
and the treaty-making power.163 Therefore, without congressional
acquiescence, the President cannot send the military to Mexico without
violating customary international human rights law.164
In foremost support of this conclusion is Congress’s expansive authority to
regulate foreign commerce.165 The Eleventh Circuit found this authority
includes “at least the power to regulate the . . . ‘instrumentalities’ of commerce
between the United States and other countries.”166 The President’s use of the
military as the instrument to stop the Mexican drug trade from crossing the
U.S. border would encroach on Congress’s exclusive and expansive commerce

155

Id. at 635–37.
Id. at 637.
157
Id. at 637–38.
158
Id. at 637.
159
American Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 414 (2003) (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11(1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)) (emphasis added).
160
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587.
161
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11–13 (granting Congress the power to declare war and “make Rules
concerning Captures,” “to raise . . . Armies,” and to “maintain a Navy . . . .”); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (naming
the President the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces).
162
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (granting the President the power to appoint Ambassadors with the
advice and consent of the Senate).
163
Id. (granting the President the power to make treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate).
164
See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 668 (1981).
165
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see U.S. v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1113 (9th Cir. 2006).
166
U.S. v. Baston, 818 F.3d 651, 668 (11th Cir. 2016).
156
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clause power. If done through unilateral presidential action, it would be an
unconstitutional exercise of power.
Consider also the “war powers.” Article II, § 2 makes the President
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Article I, § 8, Clause 11 of the U.S.
Constitution gives Congress the power to “declare War” and “make Rules
concerning Captures on Land and Water.”167 This clause vests Congress with
the authority to initiate armed conflict and to define what property may be
subsequently taken by the military.168 It operates as a direct congressional limit
on the “Commander-in-Chief” authority.169 Congress enacted the War Powers
Act over presidential veto to clarify how these shared authorities over the
military should operate.170 The Act requires the President to report to Congress
any introduction of U.S. armed forces, inter alia, anytime he introduces
substantially large numbers of the Armed Forces into a foreign country, if
those armed forces are “equipped for combat.”171 The scope, scale, and violent
nature of the drug cartels’ operations—and President Trump’s rhetoric—signal
that this requirement would also be satisfied. The Act further requires, without
regard to the quantity of troops introduced, reporting to Congress in any case
where armed forces are introduced “into situations where imminent
involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances.”172 This
provision would be triggered if the President introduced armed drones into
Mexico because the armament carried by such drones would be prima facie
evidence of their imminent involvement in hostilities. After receiving a report
from the President, Congress may exercise a supervisory function over that
deployment and, by a concurrent resolution, order the removal of those armed
forces.173 There is some, albeit limited, “historical gloss” suggesting the War
Powers Act requires congressional oversight of presidential orders deploying
the military to a foreign state for the purpose of restoring law and order. On
“February 25, 2000, President Clinton reported to Congress ‘consistent with
the War Powers Resolution’ that he had authorized the participation of a small
number of U.S. military personnel” to assist in maintaining “law and order” in
East Timor.174 On March 2, 2001, President George W. Bush continued the
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U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
Ingrid Wuerth, The Captures Clause, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1683, 1740 (2009).
169
Id. at 1743.
170
50 U.S.C.S. § 1541 (1973).
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50 U.S.C.S. § 1543 (1973).
172
Id.
173
50 U.S.C.S. § 1544 (1973).
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BARBARA SALAZAR TORREON, CONG. RESEARCH. SERV., R42738, INSTANCES
STATES ARMED FORCES ABROAD, 1798-2016 (2016).
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precedent and reported to Congress his continued commitment of U.S. military
to support law and order in East Timor.175
Next, consider the shared power over appointing and sending
ambassadors.176 The U.S. Constitution requires the Senate to provide its advice
and consent for the appointment of ambassadors.177 Ambassadors are the head
of a diplomatic mission to another state.178 A diplomatic mission is understood
to be, inter alia, the representation of the sending state’s interests and the
promotion of friendly relations between the receiving state and the sending
state.179 Therefore, the Senate has a shared power with the President over the
way the United States conducts relations with Mexico, which would
necessarily include whether the United States violates the human rights of
Mexicans.
Finally, Congress has not been silent in its views concerning the U.S.
military’s observance of human rights; therefore, the prospect of presidential
action to send the military unconstrained by customary international human
rights law to Mexico would be a Youngstown category three exercise of power.
In Congress’s declaration of policy concerning the use of the U.S. military in
foreign assistance, codified in 22 U.S.C.S. §§ 2301–2305, Congress stated that
the use of the military will be congruent with the United States’ “principal goal
. . . to promote the increased observance of internationally recognized human
rights . . . .”180 Congress has further stated: “It is the policy of the United States
. . . to affirm fundamental freedoms and internationally recognized human
rights in foreign countries, as reflected in the [UDHR] and the [ICCPR], and to
condemn offenses against those freedoms and rights as a fundamental
component of United States foreign policy . . . .”181 It is, accordingly,
inescapable that Congress has articulated a position incompatible with ordering
the U.S. military to Mexico without the constraints of customary international
human rights law. Under Justice Jackson’s oft-cited Youngstown analysis, any
executive action doing so would be unconstitutional.
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Id.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
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U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
178
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, arts. 1, 3, 14, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500
U.N.T.S. 95 (entered into force Dec. 13, 1972).
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Diplomatic Mission, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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22 U.S.C.S. § 2304 (1961).
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22 U.S.C.S. § 8202 (2007).
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CONCLUSION
President Trump has suggested both that the U.S. military should go fight
Mexican drug cartels and that, but for controlling legal authorities, the U.S.
military should in some circumstances kill civilians.182 The latter suggestion
seems to lament the existence of IHL protections against military abuses. The
situation in Mexico is not, however, an armed conflict. The drug cartels’ use of
violence is for business purposes, designed to create chaos ripe for a criminal
enterprise’s exploitation. There is no indication that the drug cartels seek to
govern or control territory beyond what is necessary for their criminal
purposes. Applying these facts to an analysis of the ICRC’s commentary and to
the requirements of AP II—in addition to comparing them to the ICTY’s
jurisprudence—results in a conclusion that the drug cartels’ violence does not
trigger CA 3’s application of IHL.
Perhaps, then, the President might be emboldened by the inapplicability of
IHL to the drug cartel violence as he endeavors to confront them. Yet, as the
commentary to AP II cautions, “this does not mean that there is no
international legal protection applicable to such situations, as they are covered
by universal and regional human rights instruments.”183 The ICCPR is one
such instrument whose protections are rightly considered to apply to Mexicans
against U.S. military actions. Even if the President rejects, as previous
administrations have, the extraterritorial reach of the ICCPR, customary
international law exists separately from treaty-based law and is also
controlling. Thus, IHRL, whether operating through the ICCPR, the American
Convention, customary international human rights law, or all three, binds the
U.S. military’s actions while operating inside of Mexico.
The President, and by extension the U.S. military, is obligated to adhere to
these international legal authorities under U.S. domestic law. The President has
a constitutional duty to faithfully execute the ICCPR. His obligation to
faithfully execute the law also extends to customary international human rights
law because, in this instance, there is no offsetting of constitutional authority
relieving him of this duty. Unless Congress decides otherwise, the “bad
hombres” of the Mexican drug cartels are entitled to certain legal human rights
protections from the U.S. military. The President should welcome, rather than
bemoan, this conclusion as a demonstration of fidelity to our nation’s founding
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LoBianco, supra note 4; Wong, supra note 6.
Sandoz, supra note 53, at 1356.
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principles and as support to a rules-based international order through which the
United States might, over time, find greater security and prosperity.

